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THE IDEA OF JUSTICE.*

I.

LAW AND JUSTICE.

The word justice has two'meanings.

I. It denotes the true maintenance and confirmation of positive law. Whatever the law determines must be carried out. The
law must be protected against arbitrary deviation therefrom.
2. Beyond this justice denotes the ultimate aim of law. In
this sense the word expresses the thought that all legal volition
without exception serves a single fundamental idea. All historic
law must be judged by this fundamental idea. This idea is the
standard by which we justify or condemn as a matter of principle a given legal volition.. In the following discussion we are
particularly concerned with the second meaning.
We must therefore analyze critically the concepts of law
and of justice and distinguish between them.
The concept of law is partial in its nature. It denotes a
peculiar species of human volition. This species of volition is in
form always the same. A specific kind of volition is distinguished
from other species of social order. The content of these various
orders may be entirely the same. Formally, however, they are
divided into different classes. This is what we do when we distinguish law from morals and external customs. The precept
*Translated from the German by Isaac Husik, the University of Pennsylvania.
(363)
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may be precisely the same, f9r example that we should greet
politely another person. But in the one case this precept bears
the formal character of a juristic command, as in the case of a
soldier; while in the other case it is a question of politeness and
of the free resolution of the person addressed.
In the first place we have here a distinction between law
and free choice. Law is inviolable so long as it remains law.
This is the meaning of Psalm 94, 15: "For right shall return
unto justice." From this is derived the first meaning of the
word juistice. It is emphasized in a wonderful manner in theOld Testament, and especially in Isaiah. But here too our observation holds good that the content of a legal command may be
precisely the same as that of an arbitrary one. The difference is
in the form in which they present themselves.
The formal characteristic of the concept of law consists,
therefore, in this, that law is conceived of as being an order
which is independent of the subjective pleasure of the individual.
The conventional rule of decorum and of all other external manners is in its meaning dependent upon the recognition- and assent
of the persons addressed by it. The arbitrary command of force
bears the implication that the despotic author thereof is not
bound by it. The implication of law is that it stands as an
objective entity above the individual. It commands in sovereign
fashion, but at the same time it is inviolable, as we mentioned
before.
The concept of law is therefore the logical quality of concrete volition. Whenever we speak of a legal volition we make
use of this concept and exhaust its meaning. The same thing is
true here as in the concept of cause. There may be any number
of causes, but in every instance we have the same kind of formal
arrangement of events. Similarly we may have before us any
number of legal demands or refusals-in every instance there
is present the determining idea of legal volition in its completeness.
The case is different with the question of justice in the second meaning of the word mentioned before. Here the problem is
to think of a given desire which co,-responds to the concept of
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law, as being in complete harmony with all other legal desires.
This is only'an ideal. It consists in the conception of the absolute whole of all human endeavors. And this whole itself is
naturally not again an object of concrete experience. But there
is in this idea of complete harmony after all a problem that we
must always pursue though we can never completely solve itlike the star (in the old picture) to which the helmsman of the
ship looks up to guide himself, though he cannot, nor does he
desire to reach it himself.
How, then, shall we describe this idea of justice more precisely, and 'what practical significance shall we ascribe to it?
II.

THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE

THEORY

OF JUSTICE.

Everyone who has to do with legal questions will always
guide his thoughts in two directions. The first thing that meets
his gaze are the paragraphs in the legal code, the positive deter-.
minations of the innumerable statutes and ordinances, the articles
of the constitutions, the rigid forms of legal habits and customs.
In ever-increasing numbers they grow on the soil of the law, and
the first question in legal matters, as was said before, is, what is
actually the law in such and such a question?
But behind and above this mass of technically formed statutes there is something else. Here the question is one of justice.
In a matter of dispute the process must not be merely correct
but just. Our desire is that the decision in question should be
based not merely upon a positive statute, but also upon rightness*
as a principle.
There are many phrases expressing this idea: good faith,
equity, moral duty, avoiding abuse, good morals, valid ground,
and so on. This multiplicity of terms in the modem languages
-is borrowed from the wealth of expressions which the classical
jurists .of Rome likewise had at their disposal. But all the
various expressions denote the one single thought, namely, that
a matter in dispute should be decided in accordance with that
principle which in the particular situation is fundamentally right.
This consideration appears first as a critique of particular
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statutes. It is also made use of in political discussions. But it
finds its immediate application -also in the administration of justice.
All positive legislation endeavors, on the basis of historical
experience, to determine in advance what would be a right decision in future cases. This is the origin of the numerous articles
and paragraphs of which we have spoken. But the legislator
can not anticipate all possibilities. Life is too complex for that.
New questions always come up which could never have been
considered before. The legislator therefore chooses a second
way. He gives indications to the parties, to counsel, and to the
judges that in future disputes they may search of their own
accord and find what would in those circumstances be the right
thing in principle. This raises the problem again of getting a.
clear notion of the meaning and idea of justice. The practical
significance of the idea of justice lies in the fact that it is necessary not only in criticising political measures, but also in judicial administration itself.
III.

THE METHOD OF FINDING JUSTICE

We must have a fixed method in order to understand what
unitary conception we have in mind when we speak of justice.
We can not evade this question by saying that the court should
decide according to his "free" opinion. For the law addresses
itself in the first place after all to those who are subject to it.
The law can not say, "You shall conduct yourselves in such a
manner as the court will afterward 'freely' indicate to you."
Besides, it is not at all right that the court should decide according to his free subjective pleasure. The opinion of the court
should be objectively right. The judge must be able to give reasons for his decision. How can he do this when the determining
fundamental thought which we call justice is not clear to him?
In discussions of this sort appeal has often been made to
the "feeling of right." Sometimes it is called also the "natural
feeling of right." But this appeal can not solve the problem
here presented. It presupposes the idea of a fundamentally just
decision. For in referring to the s6-called feeling of right what
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one really says is this: Inside of me in some mysterious way an
opinion is formed concerning what is right in principle. If,
therefore, no question is asked, under what general and permanent conditions this idea of fundamental rightness in legal things
stands, the above merely genetic consideration is no answer at
all. But it is not at all true that every human being brings with
him into the world a so-called natural feeling of right. The
child in the cradle knows nothing of just and unjust laws of the
State. The idea of justice must be gradually acquired by every
one in the course of his life. That this is done by all persons in
exactly the same way is an assumption that is quite unfounded.
Every one is the subject of numberless impressions. He often
acquires his fundamental opinions under the influence of immeasurable complications. One can never attain to unity of
thought through the merely genetic method of thinking. There
must be systematic consideration and critical reflection. The
so-called feeling of right is therefore nothing else except a-personal mode of knowing and judging the law. It has been scraped
together by any given person in his conditioned circumstances
and his particular development. For scientific study it denotes
something that is the result of mere historical accident.
It is frequently customary in discussion to contrast positive
with
moral. There is no inherent objection in referring to
law
moral law, but we must consider more precisely what this moral
law is and what determining ideas are connected with it. Aseverywhere else, so here also we must first realize that there is an
unsolved problem. By merely using the catchword "moral"
we have not yet gained any clearness on the question of the systematic method by which to direct our ideas.
Now, the word moral has two meanings, which are quite
different from one another. This difference is clear when we
consider the terms with which it is contrasted. "Moral" is.
sometimes opposed to "social." The social question is concerned
with the life of men together. The moral question as thus contrasted denotes then the inner life of the particular person, his
character, his desires. It is clear that morality as thus described
has nothing to do with the idea of justice, for the latter pre-
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supposes an external conflict of different persons, which has to
be settled in right fashion according to a principle.
The second meaning of the word moral is the same as
"right." Therefore, to refer to moral law is to repeat the problem and nothing more. We have merely the question before us
which requires an answer. If we desire to test under what conditions a right decision of a conflict is possible, we must go into
the question of the fundamental rightness of human volition in
general. We will discuss this briefly first, and then apply the
result to the question of social rightness.
IV. THE IDEA OF THE PURE WILT.
Law is a species of human volition. Justice, in the sense of
legal demands which are right in principle, must therefore be
derived from the possible justification of human desire in general. An act of striving and demanding is not justified in principle merely because it is there. It is necessary to show that its
content is well grounded by reference to a fixed standard. What
is this determining standard?
A particular purpose which is to be attained in a given situation can not be the highest law for all possible volition, because
it is limited in its meaning. This applies to every limited purpose, even though it may appear at first glance as relatively better than other purposes. To erect beautiful edifices, to invent
useful machines, to raise the level of external comfort-none of
these is an absolute standard for all possible volition, none of
them can demand that all other desire and volition should be
sacrificed for it, none of them gives a complete answer to the
question-what is a morally good volition?
In order to solve this question satisfactorily, we must get
away from all desires which are merely subjective. The idea of
a volition, good in principle, is determined by the quality of absolute and universal validity to which a specific volition must conform. We imagine, therefore, as our ideal standard a volitional
content which is free from everything that is specific and that
has to do with a given individual and his volitions.
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There is no such thing in historical reality. All actual
endeavors of man are conditioned. In actual experience we
know only limited aims. But we judge these particular endeavors and their limited aims differently according to the fundamental direction in which they are taken up and guided. This
is shown in ordinary life in our appreciation of unselfishness,
selflessness and self-sacrifice. Here we see clearly that direction.
of an idea which does not regard mere subjective desire as the
last and highest thing, for the attainment of which all means are
permissible. We think rather of a specific volition as guided
by absolute and universal validity, as directed by the infinitely
extending straight line of pure volition. Both possibilities are
given. The one is the maxim of subjectivism, the other expresses itself as an effort toward objectivity. In the first case,
the limited desire is regarded not as material to be worked over,
but as a principle of volition. In the second case only can we
speak of the rightness of a given effort as a matter of principle. The idea of free volition means, therefore, simply an
ideal process which may always be*uniformly applied to judging
efforts materially conditioned. It is not a question here of causal
freedom, but of a volition that is free in its content. The idea
of free will merely serves the purpose of giving us a sure
standard by which a volitional content as it occurs in nature can
be judged logically. This species of judging which we have
described here as pure volition is the only kind that is appropriate as a standard of judgment to all human volition, and
therein lies its firm justification.
V. THE SOCIAL IDEAL.
We must now apply the fundamental principle of human

purposes to legal volition. This belongs to the social question.
The latter is a combination of the purposes of men living together. The purposes of the one person are regarded as means
for the other, and vice versa. According to the problem here
presented, this combination must take place in the spirit of pure
volition. This ideally guiding thought consists in the .fact that
all subjective endeavor must be regarded merely as conditional
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material. Hence the- idea of justice must also consist in this,
namely, that in combining the purposes of different persons, the
ultimate determining idea must not be a merely subjective
desire
of one of the two persons in the combination.
The idea of justice culminates, therefore, in the notion of
absolutely mutual consideration. The guiding line is that of a
pure community, which must be followed as an ideal guiding
line. We may also say that the ideal problem of the law is-the
community of men of pure volition. This formula is a definition
of the fundamental idea which is at the basis of all legal volition and constitutes the ground thereof, if it is to be right in
principle. Justice is therefore the agreement of a specific legal
volition with the idea of a pure community.
If we imagine social conditions as corresponding to this idea,
we may also call such an imaginary picture the social Ideal.
But this will never be the case. The idea of a pure community
always signifies only an unattainable goal. It does not contain
the demand of establishing a utopia. It denotes only a methodical way by which historical relations may be judged properly.
How this can be methodically carried out we will explain more
precisely later. Here we will explain further the fundamental
definition of justice just given by considering a few conceptions
of this problem which are opposed to ours.
Here belongs in the first place the attempt made by the wellknown Ihering. In his book entitled "Purpose in the Law,"* he
designates law as the "Politics of Force." He asks how law originated in the history of humanity, and tries to answer the question by assuming that a victorious warrior instead of killing the
vanquished enemy made him his slave. We know nothing about
this. Such an imaginary explanation is-in any case worthless as
an answer to the question concerning the ultimate objective
meaning of historical law, which is found -everywhere. Besides,
there is no legal relation between the owner and the *slave. Such
a relation exists only betweer different owners of different slaves.
*Translated in part in the Modem Legal Philosophy Series under the title,
"Law as a Means to an End.-I. H.

THE IDEA OF JUSTICE

But when Ihering further on names as the fundamental idea of
law the self-interest which every legal ruler must follow as a
hard-hearted incorrigible egoist, he is without any doubt inconsistent. For he is surely endeavoring to find an expression for
the-objectively justified aim of all law. And the solution can not
be that the subjective egoism of any particular person represents the objectively right procedure in legal matters.
VI. SOCIAL EUD.EMONISM..

This theory is widely prevalent, but is often held very uncritically. According to this theory the highest law of human
volition is the attainment of personal pleasure and the avoidance
of pain. The aim of social life and the problem of social order
are then determined in accordance with this general purpose.
This view finds its dearest expression in the ideas of those politicians of the present day who start from the basis of social
materialism. These, representatives of the so-called materialistic
conception of history assume, in accordance with the basic idea
of the materialistic philosophy generally, that the law of causality
is the only one to be applied as the ultimate method of all scientific investigation. But no man can evade the problem of right
volition. And this problem can clearly not be solved by a merely
materialistic opinion. For the problem requires reflection upon
the unitary and fundamental idea by the spirit of which the content of all imaginable human volition may be guided. Instead
of this come those older materialists and dish up the hedonistic
doctrines of Aristippus and Epicurus in their various shades of
opinion.
But other philosophers also, who were not influenced by
materialism, have tried to accept Eudammonism as a fundamental
principle. This was especially worked out in England, particularly by Bentham and the two Mills. But Eudoemonism prevailed in the eighteenth century generally on the continent also.
Kant destroyed the theory of it absolutely in his "Critique of
the Practical Reason." But in the practice of the individual as
well as in political life the pleasure doctrine is still maintained
in principle.
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In the search for justice in the practical administration one

can scarcely make use of happiness and pleasure as guides. In
a dispute between two merchants or in an action between lessor
and lessee, or in any other legal question, the decision will
gain nothing from the idea of the happiness of all or of the
greatest happiness of the greatest number.
But even in the case of a political policy, which takes as its

aim the realization of right and justice, it is scarcely proper to °
take the happiness of the members of the State as the highest
law.
In the first place, it is clear that the inner happiness of the
individual can not be taken as the aim of a legal order. For this
means calm of mind, peace with oneself, which everyone must
give to oneself and cannot expect to get from the legislator. External fortune, comfort in external circumstances and goods, is
subject to infinite variations. It varies everywhere with taste
and personal desires, and therefore can not offer any proper
point.of view for a social order.
Very remarkable is the idea of many utilitarians that the
greatest possible amount of the greatest possible happiness should
be divided as far as possible equally among individuals The
efforts in question do not lend themselves to any quantitative
division and distribution. But as a matter of principle there is
a confusion here also of the idea of justice with a demand for
external equality. It is always a mistake to take as the measure
of consideration merely the iteed of the one who did the original
service and not rather the manner and value of his service. And
all these questions arise in the domain of historically conditioned
inequalities, the conditioned character of which in its variations
can-never be gotten rid of. But to treat unequal things equally
would be the greatest injustice possible. It has been proposed
to avoid this by taking as a standard the idea of securing to the
individual an existence "worthy of a human being." There is
no great objection to this, provided we have a right understanding of the idea thus expressed. -For the opposite of that which
is worthy of a human being is precisely that which is fitting only
for an animal and the animal desires. It must be worthy of a
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human being as a rational creature. But then we come back
again, if we think logically, to the idea of the pure will and as a
corollary to it the pure community, exactly as we developed it
above.
The same thing applies, finally, to the much used word
"common weal." This expression dates from antiquity and has
been often used since. But it merely expresses the desire to
fdlow in social life an objectively grounded procedure and not
to yield to merely subjective desires. The expression "common
weal" is therefore not inappropriate, but it merely denotes the
problem for the solution of which we have undertaken the above
consideration.
One must not, however, conclude from all these considerations that our idea is to exclude from human endeavor all striving for happiness and comfort of living. We have no such
idea. And it is above all a worthy aim of political legislation to
think of the welfare of the citizens. All I wish to say is that
this does not constitute the highest law of social volition. The
efforts of the individuals to attain happiness is rather the material to be worked over by the one whose function it is to guide
and protect the fortunes-'of the social community. This material must be worked over under the guidance of the Idea of
Jistice.
VII. Jusr LAW.
Ilow is the ideal concept of justice to be applied and realized
in practical life? We must, in the first place, guard against an
error. We must bear in mind that an idea is not creative. It
is always a mistake to think that one can, on the basis bf ideal
thinking and willing, freely produce the material for new conditions in social life. The material of human desire is given to
us. It arises in the processes of nature. All that ideal reflection can do is to judge and guide this naturally given material.
Ideal reflection is indeed necessary if the infinite mass of ever
new and always changing desires of men is not to remain in
chaos and confusion. For the idea denotes precisely the conception of an absolutely unitary method of procedure by which

-
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every imaginable content of effort and volition is judged in a
perfectly tniform manner.
From the above we get the following directions for adjudication and legislation:
In a dispute before the court, two different demands stand
confronting each other. And even if they have not yet reached
the threshhold of the tribunal and have 'not yet found the opposing formulae, it is still possible in every case mentally to set
over against every legal demand its possible contrary. And then
in our search for a decision right in principle, we must give the
preference to that legal demand in which we best satisfy the
idea of absolutely mutual consideration, the idea of the pure
community.
It is not true therefore that a specific legal demand is subsumed under the idea of the pure community, but every concrete demand comes under a concrete proposition of law. It is
only in choosing the right legal rule that the recognition 'just
mentioned of the social ideal makes its appeaiance.
We can also see clearly now that the above-mentioned expressions, "good faith," "good morals," "fairness," and so on,
really denote merely the quality of concrete legal rules. They
do not signify any mystic, moral something, we know not what.
In using and realizing these ideas, we are dealing exclusively
with a legal consideration, though one of 'a peculiar formal character.
The same method must be followed in political questions.
The difference is that we are not dealing in this case with a dispute between two single parties, but with the fortunes of a legal
whole. On the other hand it is quite indifferent, if we are considering the proper methodical procedure, whether we are dealing with the so-called internal or external policy of a community.
In neither case is it sufficient to designate the political activity
merely as an art. To be sure, in politics, skill in practical
psychology plays a great role. But we can not rely altogether
upon mere personal accident. And if there is to be any progress,
it can be found only if we strive to establish our politics upon
a scientific basis.
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The principles of the methodical reflection which we require
are once more the following. As a result-of historical conditions
there arise uniform mass phenomena in the relations of the
social order: wealth and poverty, good and bad services, particular modes of living, and all such other conditions as appear to the
social observer. These mass phenomena give rise to efforts to
change the traditional social order. These efforts will be more
or less far-reaching, and will come in conflict with other efforts
desiring to maintain things as they are. And here too preference
should be given to those among the opposing efforts in whose
essence we recognize as their ultimate aim a tendency toward
the Idea of the Pure Community.
Can this be always exactly proved and carried out? This
question, to be sure, can not be unconditionally answered in the
affirmative. Both in adjudication and in political activity, many
an instance will arise where no exact proof is possible. But this
is a fate which our inveitigation shares in common with all
scientific activity. The naturalist too must confess on many an
occasion that he is not yet able to see and explain the exact
causal connection of certain natural phenomena. The same thing
will no doubt often happen in the scientific construction of the
content of concrete human efforts. And in that case it behooves the lover of truth openly and freely to acknowledge the
position thus arising of true scientific possibility.
Everything, in practical life, however, which may be correctly determined on the basis of the idea of the Pure Will and
Justice, gives us in all cases merely an objectively just law. An
absolutely just law, on the other hand, is not within the domain
of possibility. The only things which are absolutely valid are
the pure methods of ordering our intellectual life-in this connection they are the concept and the ideal of law. But the application of these pure forms of comprehension and judgment is
always of'relative significance only. For they have reference to
a limited and changing and imperfectly given material, in perception as well as in volition. Accordingly, there is no single
concrete legal order which is absolutely just in respect to its
specific content.
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VIII. JUSTICE AND LOVE.

We can not conclude these discussions concerning the idea
of justice without mentioning one idea which, especially in modem times, some have thought, leads to a different result from
ours. I mean the attempt to show that the search after justice
is not of such great importance, and that it would be superfluous
if we followed the Scriptural precept to love our neighbor.
What, then, is the relation between Justice and Love?
The well-known Russian writer Tolstoi, with more emphasis than anyone else, has given expression to the opinion that
all law, nay, all social order, would be superfluous if we followed
the command "to serve" one another. He is mistaken. Social
order is nothing else than the use of the purposes of one person
as means for those of another, and vice versa. We have already
called attention to this above, when we differentiated between
law and morals. Here we must emphasize the point that this
idea of the social order is logically necessary. "Service," too,
is only conceivable as the carrying out of an external rule among
various individuals. But whether such service is really good and
just, is still an open question. There is such a thing as doing
another a service for a bad purpose. The difference between
good and bad, and in social life between just and unjust, is thus
tacitly presupposed in the words of Tolstoi. The reference,
therefore, to the necessity of love can not render superfluous or
replace the effort to get a clear idea of the conception of justice.
The correct relation between justice and love is stated definitely in the Epistle to the Romans (13 :IO): "Love is the fulfilling of the Law."
The idea of justice denotes the possibility as a matter of
principle of right behavior in social things. But it gives only a
possibIlity. This is indeed the case in all scientific activity. It
gives possibilities of right knowledge and volition. That these
possibilities should become realities is something that science as
such can not bring about.
Here religious feeling is indispensable. What we call love
in our theoretical discussion comes from religion. Love in this
imlxrtant meaning -denotes devotion to the good, to right volition.
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Justice and love therefore must supplement one another.
The beautiful words of the German poet apply here:
"In the union of justice and love, and there alone,
"Is expiation of human blame and atoneijent of earthly
life."
Rudolf Stammler.
Berlin, Germany.

